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## Viewing cable 06OSLO467, GRIM" PROSPECTS FOR SRI LANKA PEACE TALKS

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06OSLO467**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">06OSLO467</a>	<a href="#">2006-04-11 16:15</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Oslo</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3955943.ece>

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OO RUEHWEB

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FM AMEMBASSY OSLO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3782  
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0329

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000467

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016

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SUBJECT: "GRIM" PROSPECTS FOR SRI LANKA PEACE TALKS

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Doug Apostol, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.  
Summary and Action Request  
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2.(C) Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer hosted a Sri Lankan Co-Chair representative meeting at the MFA on April 11. Hanssen-Bauer outlined the current situation in advance of the scheduled April 19 Geneva conference (so-called

"Geneva Two") between representatives of the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Calling prospects of the conference occurring as "grim," Hanssen-Bauer noted issues (and internal pressures) dividing both parties. In addition, he believes recent explosions (likely the work of the LTTE) and the assassination of a Sri Lankan official by the rival LTTE faction Karuna further fueled existing tensions which would forestall the forthcoming conference. After the Co-Chair representative meeting, Hanssen-Bauer met alone with Pol/Econ Officer and candidly revealed that Geneva Two will likely be postponed, if not canceled. He questioned the Sri Lankan President's grasp of the situation and/or his intentions. The Special Envoy voiced apprehension about the Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna (JVP) efforts to demonize Norway through negative propaganda, which he felt would increase should Geneva Two not take place, as planned. Finally, he noted the LTTE political leadership faced internal military pressures, which could affect Geneva Two moving forward.

3.(C) Hanssen-Bauer plans on releasing a statement encouraging the parties to continue honoring existing Geneva commitments and move forward with the Geneva Two meeting. He is encouraging other Co-Chairs to release similar messages as soon as possible. Post therefore requests the Department consider issuing a statement urging the parties to attend the planned Geneva Two meeting and recognize existing cease-fire obligations.

#### Sri Lankan President in Delicate Balancing Act

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4.(C) Hanssen-Bauer believes that GSL President Rajapaksa must balance internal political pressures (in addition to those from rival parties) in any determination to continue the peace process. Successful Geneva Two talks would improve the President's southern power base (and may influence him pushing for early elections).

#### LTTE Sending Mixed Messages

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5.(C) Hanssen-Bauer finds mixed messages from the LTTE. Although the LTTE indicates it wants to go beyond cease-fire talks and eventually discuss other issues with the GSL (e.g. economic development and democracy building), the first LTTE issue is a guaranty of security for the Geneva-bound LTTE delegation, which Rajapaksa has given. Hanssen-Bauer finds the LTTE's greatest issue is for the GSL to disarm/disband the Karuna faction. The LTTE feels that the GSL is "shutting its eyes" to Karuna's operations, and speculates that Karuna may be used by the GSL as a weapon in a war against the LTTE. The LTTE concludes that the GSL armed forces, in addition to the Karuna paramilitary forces, could defeat the LTTE militarily.

6.(C) In addition, the LTTE asserts that the government's failure to disarm/disband military groups (particularly Karuna in the east) is a direct violation of the first Geneva talks. According to Hanssen-Bauer, nothing has been done by the GSL to address this LTTE issue. The Special Envoy feels that the LTTE would accept the containment of the Karuna faction (and not press for disbanding Karuna) as a precondition for the LTTE proceeding with Geneva Two.

7.(C) Finally, the LTTE Central Committee seeks the GSL's assistance in arranging a LTTE pre-Geneva "strategy meeting" to be held in Kilinochichi. Rajapaksa has refused to offer military transport to bring LTTE forces to Kilinochichi, which Hanssen-Bauer suspects is a result of the President's perceived need to show that he is not "soft" to political rivals. Earlier GSL governments have provided such military transport. Hanssen-Bauer noted that the LTTE could be asked to go to Geneva Two without the Central Committee meeting, but the result will create a "negative" atmosphere in Geneva. Norway supports the Central Committee meeting, viewed as a means of preventing the LTTE's isolation (and resort to violence).

18. (C) Hanssen-Bauer spoke at length about his concern of increased violence by the LTTE, specifically three incidents of claymore mine attacks (most recently today). The LTTE-sponsored attacks are apparently retaliation for the Karuna-sponsored assassination of Vanniasingham Vigneswaran, a moderate Tamil politician in Trimcomalee.

#### Frustrated Norwegians Resolved to Move Forward

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9.(C) Although Hanssen-Bauer is concerned with the recent acts of violence, he impressed upon Co-Chair representatives the need to move forward. Prior to the recent claymore attacks, the LTTE advocated postponing Geneva Two. In his view, the GSL now thinks the LTTE must go to Geneva, particularly given Canada's listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Norway will issue a statement today urging the parties to go to Geneva, and welcomes similar statements from Co-Chair countries. The statement will essentially provide that Norway encourages the parties to meet face-to-face and halt tensions, but such decision must be that of the GSL and LTTE themselves.

10.(C) The Norwegians view a constructive conversation at Geneva Two as a means to defuse the charged climate. He viewed any LTTE postponement of Geneva Two as likely leading to the LTTE being recognized by the EU as a terrorist group. Most importantly, he restated that the LTTE must cease its violence. He informed the GSL that it must comply with its existing Geneva obligations (including honoring the cease-fire).

11.(C) Admittedly frustrated by both the GSL and LTTE demands on Norway, Hanssen-Bauer has reminded them that Norway's role is limited as a facilitator and, if "they are serious," both the parties should enable each other to attend Geneva Two. He noted that "Norway cannot make the meeting happen if the GSL and LTTE do not want it to happen." Hanssen-Bauer, stating that the atmosphere was "grim today, and hopefully positive tomorrow" felt that if the parties do not meet on April 19, he will advocate for a postponement, and not a cancellation.

#### "Low-key Statements" Requested from Co-Chairs

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12.(C) When pressed by the Japanese Ambassador, Hanssen-Bauer envisioned any supportive statements from the Co-Chairs as being both "low-key" and "outside the public eye." These statements would be directed only to the parties involved, and should stress the importance of Geneva Two. The parties should thus meet to defuse violence and further implement the existing cease-fire agreement.

#### Parties Need to Get Their Acts Together

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13.(C) Following the Co-Chairs representative meeting, Hanssen-Bauer met privately with Pol/Econ Officer. The Special Envoy started the meeting by praising Ambassador Lunstead's efforts in Colombo (particularly regarding the LTTE's military transportation requests). The Special Envoy is troubled that President Rajapaksa is either consistently uninformed or not forthcoming. He also voiced concerns that the LTTE political leadership is facing increasing pressures from the LTTE military leadership. Hanssen-Bauer seemed particularly concerned about the JVP, despite its recent election losses. He believes that postponing or canceling Geneva Two will be seen as a JVP victory, which has stepped up its anti-Norwegian propaganda efforts. With the recent elections, Hanssen-Bauer states that the parties have not had time to "get their acts together" and focus on issues leading up to Geneva Two. He concludes that Geneva Two will be postponed, or even perhaps canceled. The question remains as to which party will actually cancel/postpone the conference. Visit Oslo's Classified website:  
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m>

